In comparison to common names, people's names are difficult to learn and remember (e.g., Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991; Cohen, 1990 ). People's names can also show a selective sparing of comprehension and a selective deficit in production after neurological damage (see Bre'dart, Brennen, & Valentine, 1997 , for a review). Furthermore, people's names evince a different pattern of long-term priming phenomena compared with common names (Valentine, Hollis, & Moore, 1998) . Traditionally, the processing characteristics associated with proper names have been attributed to the idea that proper names are unique and meaningless labels (see Burton & Bruce, 1992; Cohen & Burke, 1993) or that proper names are conceptually specific, concrete labels from a subordinate level of a conceptual hierarchy (Durso & O' Sullivan, 1983; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997) . However, factors such as uniqueness, meaningfulness, and conceptual specificity are difficult to define and quantify. Indeed, they have the potential to vary at both a semantic and a lexical level and depend on the subcategory of the proper name in question. Therefore, simple explanations such as uniqueness and meaningfulness cannot adequately characterize proper-name processing when one considers categories other than people's names. Valentine, Brennen, and Br6dart (1996) produced a theoretical model that incorporates the notion of uniqueness and meaningfulness while detailing the processing differences of common names and proper names. In this respect, empirical evidence provides support for Valentine et al.' s model where other models would fail to provide a comprehensive explanation (Valentine et al., 1998 for a review). The model has been developed from theories of face recognition (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986; Burton, Bruce, & Johnston, 1990) but is also compatible with models of speech production, having a single lexicon mediating lexical access during speech production and word identification (Roelofs, 1992) . Figure 1 depicts Valentine et al.'s (1996) model. The architecture remains as per the original publication. However, because the experiments reported here involve a number of different categories of proper name, it is more appropriate to use the term "token marker" in place of PIN (person identity node) and "type and token recognition units" in place of face recognition units and object recognition units, respectively.
In accordance with models of speech production, lexical representations are separate from the representation of conceptual knowledge. Lexical representations appear in two forms: lemmas and lexemes. Lemmas are considered to be the first stage of lexical access and are abstract representations that code both conceptual and syntactic (but not phonological) properties of the lexical entry (Kempen & Huijbers, 1983; Levelt, 1989) .
Access to the lemma and the connectivity between the lemma and nonlinguistic conceptual knowledge is the key issue addressed in the experiments reported here. According to Valentine et al. (1996) , access to a lemma from an image representation operates by the conceptual system. However, the processing route to the lemma differs depending on the nature of identity. In line with models of face recognition, lemmas for people's names must be specified by a particular token or address in the conceptual memory system. In terms of models of face recognition, this token address in memory has been termed the "person identity node" (PIN). The PIN plays the role of a token marker serving as an amodal gateway to the conceptual system, allowing access to identity-specific conceptual information for each known person. The PIN (token marker) can, therefore, be viewed as the sole point of access to and from the conceptual system for the unique referent that it represents. For people's names, the token marker also serves to link the conceptual system with lexical representations. Access from a face representation to a person's name can only be achieved by this single link from the token marker to the lemma that represents the name. Therefore, the role of the PIN in the processing of proper names is the aspect of representation that captures pure reference.
In contrast, lemmas for common names access conceptual memory directly by a diffuse network of multiple connections rather than a single link. This connectivity captures the fact that common names have many conceptual relations. Hence, the connectivity between the conceptual system and the lexical representations are different for proper names and common names. Consequently, the role of the token marker captures the difference between the cognitive processing of people's names and common names (see Valentine et al., 1996) .
A number of predictions can be derived from the architecture depicted in Figure 1 . First, it is necessary to specify the assumptions that underlie the specific predictions made.
The first assumption is that familiarity decisions are based on the activity of the node that directly accessed the conceptual system. Familiarity decisions made to people's faces and people's names are based on activation of a PIN, whereas lexical decisions are based on the activation of lemmas. This follows assumptions made by Burton et al. (1990) with their connectionist style implementation of face processing models. This difference occurs because of the nature of the decision and the stimulus. To make decisions regarding person attributes, identity-specific conceptual information is required. According to models of face recognition, this information is accessed only by a person identity node (PIN). In contrast, a lexical decision can be made at the lemma, because this decision simply requires a check as to whether a word exists in the lexicon.
The second assumption is that repetition priming occurs as an increase in connection strength (also known as connection weight) resulting from activation passing between the different processing modules (these modules are represented by boxes in Figure 1 ). This interpretation of repetition priming was proposed by Burton et al. (1990) ; Monsell, Matthews, and Miller (1992); and Vitkovitch and Humphreys (1991) .
Third, all connection weights are assumed to be bidirectional. Thus, connection strength is equal regardless of the direction in which activation passes through the link (see Burton et al., 1990) .
One finding is that people's names evince a different pattern of long-term repetition priming phenomena compared with common names (Valentine et al., 1998) . These differences arise from the role of the token marker in mediating the recognition of people's faces and names. The first prediction is that repetition priming of a name familiarity decision to people's names should cross stimulus modality. Valentine et al. (1998) provided empirical evidence that supported the predictions of cross-modality repetition priming of people's names. Experiments showed that people's names produced facilitation from an auditory name familiarity decision to a visual name familiarity decision. The magnitude of this crossmodal facilitation was similar to within-modality priming. Crossmodality priming did not occur when common names were presented in a lexical-decision task. The model accounts for crossmodal facilitation for people's names as follows: To make a familiarity decision to a person's name successfully, one must access the identity representation (i.e., processing must access the token marker from the lemma). This identity information is required irrespective of the modality of presentation. Repetition priming is assumed to arise from strengthening a connection that is used in both the prime and the test tasks. Hence, facilitation from an auditory presentation to a visual presentation of a person's name occurs. In contrast, no such cross-modality facilitation occurs for words presented as a lexical-decision task. The lexicaldecision task requires access only to the lemma and does not require access to a token maker (no identity-specific information is required to make the decision). Processing that occurs before the lemma access (i.e., from the name recognition units to the lemma) is modality specific. Because there are no processing pathways in common to auditory and visual lexical decision, no cross-modal facilitation is found for lexical decision to common names.
A second prediction was that production of a person's name in response to seeing a famous face should prime recognition of the same person's name. Valentine et al. (1998) also found that participants who had produced the names of famous people showed facilitation of a subsequent name familiarity decision task. The degree of facilitation was as great as that found when a visual name familiarity decision to people's names was repeated during the prime and test phases of the experiment. Processing by the highly specific token marker-lemma linkage is required for tasks involving person identity (such as name familiarity decision and face naming). During the face naming task, activation must flow between the relevant token recognition unit to the appropriate lemma by means of the token marker. Both face naming and name familiarity decision require access to the token marker during the prime phase and the test phase to make the decision successfully; consequently, the model predicts facilitation in an abstractionist (item-specific) fashion for people's names. Note that the assumption of a single connection weight for a bidirectional token markerlemma link is required for this interpretation.
An alternative set of predictions emerge for the processing of common names. A lexical decision to common name stimuli is not primed by prior naming of an object picture. Naming a picture of an object requires activation to flow between a type recognition unit to the lemma by the conceptual system. However, it is important to remember that for common names, the connectivity between the conceptual system and the lemma involves multiple, diffuse connections and does not require mediation using a token marker. Furthermore, a lexical decision is made at the level of the lemma and does not require access to the conceptual system or a token marker. If activation were to pass into the conceptual system, the complex multiple links would diffuse any activation that might exist. Therefore, processing during the prime and test phases does not involve any specific connections that are common to both tasks; thus, no facilitation occurs for common names during lexical decision after picture naming. Another detailed account of the model by Valentine et al. (1996) , together with its assumptions, and predictions can be found in Valentine et al. (1998) .
The apparent differences in cross-modal and cross-domain repetition priming for people's names and common names are of particular interest because changes to the nature of the task or the modality of presentation between training and test have often been found to reduce or eliminate facilitation for indirect tests of memory (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979) . There are cases in which facilitation has been shown to cross both stimulus domain and stimulus modality in tasks that tap explicit memory for common names (e.g., from words to pictures). Park et al. (1998) found facilitation to transfer between words and pictures in which the test measure involved explicit recognition rather than an indirect test of memory. It is generally agreed that the presence of cross-modal and cross-modality facilitation depends on the nature of the experimental task and the extent to which the experimental tasks involve a direct test of memory or conceptual processing (e.g., K. Kirsner & Smith, 1974; M. Kirsner, Milech, & Standen, 1983; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999) . The presence of cross-modal and cross-domain facilitation can also be attributed to episodic mediation, particularly when the experimental presentation involves a high degree of repetition (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987) . The experiments reported here were designed to minimize the influence of episodic retrieval by keeping the proportion of repeated items small and using a large number of filler items. This keeps the participant's awareness of the repetition to a minimum and renders episodic recall a poor strategy for completing the test task. The choice of experimental task is also an important consideration. The processing demands are minimized to produce fast responses to the unprimed items. These conditions are considered to minimize the influence of episodic retrieval, and so that the patterns of data observed are unlikely to be attributable to an episodic account (Weldon, 1991; Wheeldon & Monsell, 1992) .
The aim of this research was to determine whether the previous findings of Valentine et al. (1998) obtained with people's names could be replicated and extended to other classes of proper name. If it is the role of the token marker that is the critical factor in determining the pattern of cross-modality and cross-domain facilitation, then this result should be found with other classes of proper names. In these experiments, contrast is made between the longterm priming of people's names, landmark names, and country names (proper names) with object names (common names).
Experiments 1 to 3 used a cross-modal repetition priming paradigm. Experiment 1 aimed to investigate three categories of proper names: people's names, landmark names, and country names. In the prime phase, names were presented in either the visual or auditory modality. In keeping with the study by Valentine et al. (1998) , proper name stimuli were presented in a name familiarity decision task. These tasks were compared with a task in which a lexical decision was made to common names. The methodology and rationale were analogous to Valentine et al.'s (1998) study of people's names. Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether the presence of cross-modality priming could be attributed to an effect of word frequency. Experiment 3 explored crossmodality priming for names of basic and subordinate level concepts to explore the role of the specificity of common names.
Experiments 4 and 5 investigated facilitation of a name familiarity decision from a prime task that required name production. Experiment 4 compared the facilitation of a name familiarity decision task from a prime task involving name production, a picture familiarity decision, or a name familiarity or lexicaldecision task. The methodology and rationale were adapted from Valentine et al.'s (1998) study of people's names. The aim of Experiment 4 was to determine whether name production would facilitate the visual recognition of the same items name, for people's names, landmark names, and country names. Experiment 5 attempted to replicate the findings of Experiment 4, when the same picture was presented for the production of a landmark name or country name. Once again, facilitation of a name familiarity decision task was observed after the prime task involving name production.
Similar processing for all proper names could be expected if all subcategories of proper name are considered to have a similar cognitive architecture. Variations in the processing of subcategories of proper name may indicate that differences in their representational structure exist. A comparison of different categories of proper name may provide evidence for the role of the token marker for proper names other than people's names.
Experiment 1
The model by Valentine et al. (1996) predicts that, for people's names stimuli, cross-modal priming should occur. As explained early in this article, this prediction occurs as a result of the nature of connectivity between the token marker and the lemma for people's names. Valentine et al. (1998) also predicted that no cross-modality priming should occur when common names are presented in a lexical-decision task. In this regard, common names (object names) were also included in the current study. Many authors used the familiarity decision task as an analogue to the lexical-decision task (Bruce, 1983; Bruce & Valentine, 1985 Bruce & Young, 1986; Ellis, 1982; Valentine, Moore, Flude, Young, & Ellis, 1993) . However, we are not assuming the compatibility of familiarity and lexical-decision task. Rather, the lexical decision to object names was included, because Valentine et al. (1996) predicted that no cross-modal facilitation would be observed for object names presented as a lexical-decision task. This prediction emerges because the processing from name recognition units to the lemma are modality specific. There are no processing pathways common to both the prime phase and the test phase of the experiment; thus, no cross-modal facilitation is expected for object names presented as a lexical-decision task. The aim of this experiment was to replicate the cross-modal facilitation for people's names and determine whether the finding would generalize to other classes of proper name (names of landmarks and countries).
Method
Participants. A total of 112 participants (27 men and 85 women) took part in the experiment. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years (Af = 27 years).
Stimuli. For each noun category, two sets of 9 critical items were constructed (Appendix A). There was no significant difference between the word length of the two stimuli sets. In addition, for each noun category 23 filler items, 50 unfamiliar items, and 20 practice items were also selected. In respect of people's names, the critical and filler items were names of well-known celebrities (e.g., RUBY WAX, MARGARET THATCHER). The unfamiliar items were plausible unfamiliar names (e.g., MARK JONES). For the category of landmarks, the critical items were names of famous landmarks (e.g., BIG BEN, STATUE OF LIBERTY). The names were selected from a pilot study in which different participants were asked to name a series of famous landmarks. The most reliable items were selected as critical items in the present study. Additional items were chosen as filler famous (e.g., REGENTS' PARK) and plausible unfamiliar items (e.g., HARRY'S COLUMN, STATUE OF DAY). In respect of country names, the critical and filler items were names of well-known countries (e.g., SPAIN, FRANCE). As before, a set of pronounceable unfamiliar names were formed (e.g., NOBLELAND, CETTIUS, GALLAPORT).
For the lexical-decision task with common names, the critical and filler items were names of familiar objects (e.g., BUTTERFLY, CANDLE). A selection of pronounceable nonwords was produced to act as unfamiliar items (e.g., GORMIL, FAMERN).
Apparatus. For the visual presentations, stimuli were presented on the screen of an IBM-compatible computer. The experiment was produced using Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL2), which records responses with millisecond accuracy. The participants' responses were recorded using keypresses on the keyboard. For the auditory presentation of the prime task, stimuli were presented in random order using headphones from a cassette tape recorder. The participant made a response by pressing one of two keys on a handheld response box. An LED indicator enabled the experimenter to monitor the accuracy of the responses, which were recorded manually.
Design. The experiment had a mixed design with three factors: prime task modality (visual, auditory) , and noun category (people, landmarks, countries, objects) were between-participants factors. The effect of priming (primed, unprimed) was a within-participants factor. There were two sets of nine critical items for each category of noun. One of these sets appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the primed items. The other set of nine critical items appeared only in the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the unprimed (control) items. With the exception of the primed items, no other items were repeated between prime and test. The assignment of items to the primed and unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for each experimental condition.
The experiment consisted of two phases: a prime phase and a test phase. All participants carried out their decision with a single category of stimuli during both the prime phase and the test phase. Each participant received a prime phase in either the visual or the auditory modality, followed by a test phase. All participants received the test phase in the visual modality. There were 28 participants for each noun category: 14 received the visually presented prime task, and 14 received the auditory presented prime task.
Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of the four noun category groups (people, landmarks, countries, objects). Participants who received the people's names, landmark, and country name stimuli were required to perform a familiarity decision. Participants who received the object names were required to perform a lexical decision. In each case, participants received a prime phase followed by a test phase; however, they were not informed that the experiment consisted of two stages. Before each phase, 10 practice trials were given. The prime phase consisted of a total of 50 stimuli (9 primed critical items, 16 filler famous items, and 25 unfamiliar items). For the visual presentations, each trial consisted of a 250-ms tone followed after 500 ms by presentation of the stimulus in uppercase 14-point Arial font in the center of the visual display. The participants' response terminated the display of the stimulus. Each participant saw a different random order of stimuli and was required to make a decision as quickly and as accurately as possible. For the auditory prime phase, stimuli were presented using headphones from a cassette tape recorder. Two different random orders of stimuli were constructed for each set of primed and unprimed items. In each trial, a name was presented, and participants were instructed to make a decision by pressing yes or no on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. The experimenter recorded the accuracy of the participants' responses manually.
The test phase consisted of 50 stimuli (9 critical items [primed], 9 control items [unprimed] , 7 filler famous items, and 25 unfamiliar items) and was presented visually to all participants. Only the 9 critical (primed) items were repeated between the prime phase and the test phase of the experiment. The procedure and presentation were the same as in the visually presented prime phase.
Results
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test phase were analyzed. A response to an item was included in the analyses only if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test phases. The accuracy and response time (RT) are given in Table 1 . A proportional facilitation score was calculated for each data point (unprimed response time -primed response time/unprimed response time). The proportional facilitation scores are plotted as a function of noun type and prime task modality in Figure 2 .
The raw data for each noun group were subjected to analysis of variance (ANOVA) separately, with repeated measures on the priming factor and prime task modality as a between-participants factor (identified by the subscript 1) and also analyzed by item with priming and task as a within-items factor (identified with the subscript 2).
For the category of people's names, the main effect of prime task modality was significant only in the by-items analysis F,(l, 26) = 2.62, p = .11, F 2 (l, 17) = 13.64,/> < .01. Responses after the auditory presented prime task were generally slower than those after the visually presented prime task. This can be explained simply as an effect of practice. There was a significant main effect of priming, F,(l, 26) = 24.88, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 20.44, p < .01, confirming that response times were generally faster to the primed items than to the unprimed items. Simple main effects indicated that significant priming occurred after both the visually presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 10.76, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 19.13, p < .01, and after the auditory presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 14.24, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 8.82, p < .01.
For the category of landmark names, the main effect of prime task modality was significant, F^l, 26) = 6.15, p = .11, F 2 (l, 17) = 13.64, p < .01. This suggests that responses after the auditory presented prime task differed from those after the visually presented prime task. There was a significant main effect of priming, Fj(l, 26) = 24.88, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 20.44,p < .01, confirming that response times were faster to the primed items than to the unprimed items. The interaction between prime task modality and priming was not significant, F,(l, 26) = 1.60, p = .21, F 2 (l, 17) = 2.39, p = .14. Because the experimental hypotheses concerned the interaction, simple main effects were used to explore further. Significant priming occurred after the visually presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 14.18, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 34.01, p < .01 and after the auditory presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 3.89, p < .05, F 2 (l, 17) = 14.75, p < .01. For the category of country names, the main effect of prime task modality was not significant, F,(l, 26) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) = 1.17, p = .29. Response times were similar after the different prime tasks. There was a significant main effect of priming, F,(l, 26) = 4.63, p < .05, F 2 (l, 17) = 8.64, p < .01, confirming that response times to the primed items differed from those to the unprimed items. The interaction between prime task modality and priming was significant, F,(l, 26) = 6.33, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 5.30, p < .05. Because the experimental hypotheses concerned the interaction, simple main effects were used to explore further. Significant priming occurred after the visually presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 10.90, p < .05, F 2 (l, 17) = 12.39, p < .01. However, no significant priming occurred after the auditory presented prime task, FiU, 26) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) < 1.
For the category of object names presented for lexical decision, the main effect of prime task modality was significant in the by-items analysis, F,(l, 26) = 3.46, p = .07, F 2 (l, 17) = 7.03, p < .01. Responses after the auditory prime task were slower than those after the visually presented prime task. Once again this effect can be attributed to practice. The main effect of priming was not significant, F,(l, 26) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) < 1. The interaction between prime task modality and priming was significant in the byparticipant analysis, F,(l, 26) = 6.91, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 2.65, p = .12. Because the experimental hypotheses concerned the interaction, simple main effects were used to explore further. Significant priming occurred after the visually presented prime task in the by-participant analysis, F,(l, 26) = 4.72, p < .05, F 2 (l, 17) = 1.67, p = .21. No significant priming occurred after the auditory presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 2.38, p = .13, F 2 (l, 17) < 1.
Analyses of the raw reaction times for the auditory prime task alone were carried out, taking participants as the random factor with noun category as a between-participants comparison and the effect of priming as a within-participants factor (identified by the subscript 1). An analysis was also carried out, taking items as the random factor (identified by the subscript 2). The interaction between noun category and priming was significant, F,(3, 52) = 9.16, p < .01, F 2 (3, 68) = 6.15, p < .01. Simple main effects were used to explore the interaction. There was a significant effect of priming for people's names, F,(l, 52) = 21.00, p < .01, F 2 (l, 68) = 12.77, p < .01, and landmark names, F,(l, 52) = 18.92, p < .01, F 2 (l, 68) = 13.93, p < .01. However, the effect of priming was not significant for country names or object names (all Fs < 1). Parallel analyses were performed with ANOVA using the proportional scores and showed an analogous pattern of results that supported our interpretation of the data.
Discussion
Experiment 1 aimed to test the hypothesis that proper names would produce cross-modal facilitation from a name familiarity decision presented in the auditory modality to a name familiarity decision presented in the visual modality. A further prediction was that the facilitation produced in the cross-modal presentation would be equivalent to that from a within-modality prime presentation. These hypotheses were supported for the categories of people's names and landmark names. Further comparisons determined that cross-modal facilitation did not occur for common names of everyday objects when presented for a lexical decision. In contradiction of the experimental hypothesis, no cross-modal facilitation was found for country names.
To account for the lack of cross-modal priming for country names, one needs to consider the connectivity between the lemma and the conceptual system. Country names are likely to have a diffuse connectivity, from the lemma directly to the conceptual system because of the many associations of country names. The fact that they can be used as adjectives as well as nouns is evidence of such associations. In short, country names have sense and thus are not pure referencing expressions. In this case, country names would not be represented with a token marker. Therefore, a familiarity decision to a country name would depend on access to the conceptual system rather than a token marker, with activation passing from the lemma to the conceptual system directly using diffuse links. The spread of activation would be similar to that found when common names are presented for decision; hence, no cross-modality facilitation would be found or expected. This interpretation suggests that there are limitations for the view that all proper names are pure referencing expressions and are mediated by a token marker in memory.
There were differences in the unprimed baseline for making familiarity decisions. The unprimed response times for people's name and landmark name stimuli were larger than those for the country name and object stimuli. There are a number of explanations for these differences. First, the model predicts that items that require processing using the token marker would have longer processing times than those that access the conceptual system directly. This is because access to the token marker involves an extra processing stage. Indeed, differences in unprimed baseline condition have been found for lexical decisions to common names and in previous studies that have used name familiarity decisions to people's names (e.g., Valentine et al., 1993) . Second, differences in baseline can be attributed simply to an effect of word length. People's names and landmark names are longer than the country and object names (Appendix A).
One potential confound that requires careful consideration is word frequency of the different categories of noun. We argue that it is unlikely that the cross-modality facilitation found with people's names and landmark names occurs as an artifact of name frequency. The people's names and landmark name stimuli used in these experiments were chosen from a selection of picture items that participants were able to name spontaneously. Therefore, the experimental items must be relatively high in familiarity and frequency in order for the participants to have performed the task successfully. Furthermore, it is simply not possible to equate the frequency of items between the different noun groups. First, people's names and names of landmarks are lexical compounds whose members are often highly familiar, frequent words (such as TOWER, BRIDGE, PALACE). In attempting to establish the frequency of these items, one must take into account both members of the compound. Therefore, establishing frequency for these lexical entries cannot be achieved in the same way as for common names. Nevertheless, the issue of frequency needs to be addressed further. Repetition effects have been found to be influenced by frequency for common words that are presented visually when the prime and test phase presentations are conducted within the same modality. In studies with common name stimuli, an advantage for low-frequency words has been found (e.g., Kinoshita, 1995; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977) . However, an interaction between prime modality and the effect of word frequency has not been demonstrated. The possibility that differences in word frequency were responsible for the cross-modal facilitation was addressed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
We investigated common names derived from categories of high and low frequency. It might be argued that people's names and names of landmarks are labels of lower frequency and familiarity compared with country names and object names. To test whether these differences could account for the presence of priming after cross-modality presentation, very low-frequency names were compared to a set of very high-frequency names using the cross-modal methodology. If frequency and familiarity were responsible for the cross-modality priming found in Experiment 1, then differences in priming would be expected when very low-and very highfrequency words are directly compared. In contrast, if the findings of Experiment 1 occurred because of effects of word frequency, then significant cross-modal facilitation would be expected for the low-frequency names but not for the high-frequency names.
The design of the experiment was adapted from that of Experiment 1. As in the previous experiment, within-modality and cross-modality priming were compared between participants, and the effect of priming was a within-participant factor. An additional within-participants factor was introduced: word frequency (low, high).
Method
The number of critical stimuli was doubled, so that there were 18 critical items in each primed and unprimed set. Half of these items were lowfrequency names, and half were high-frequency names. Both sets of names were matched for familiarity, concreteness, and word length. The sets of low-frequency names had a mean frequency of less than 1 occurrence per million. The sets of high-frequency names had a mean frequency of over 500 occurrences per million (Kucera and Francis ratings from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database; see Appendix B for a list of the critical stimuli). The number of filler and unfamiliar items was increased. In the prime phase there were 90 trials: 18 critical items to be primed, plus 27 filler items and 45 unfamiliar items. In the test phase of the experiment, there were also 90 trials: 36 critical items (18 primed items, 18 unprimed items), 9 filler items, and 45 unfamiliar items.
Participants. Twenty-eight participants (6 men and 22 women) took part in the experiment. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years (M = 31 years).
Procedure. The apparatus and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. Each phase of the experiment was preceded by 10 practice trials. To try to equate the processing demands of this experiment with the previous name familiarity decision to proper names, participants were instructed to make "a familiarity decision to each item" rather than perform a lexical decision.
Results
As in Experiment 1, responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test phase were analyzed. A response to an item was included in the analyses only if the correct response was given in both the prime phase and the test phase. The accuracy and timing of responses are given in Table 2 . A proportional facilitation score was calculated for each data point (unprimed response time -primed response time/unprimed re- sponse time). The proportional facilitation scores are plotted as a function of noun type and prime task modality in Figure 3 . An analysis of the raw reaction times was carried out, taking participants as the random factor with prime task modality as a between-participants comparison and the effect of priming and word frequency as a within-participants factor (identified by the subscript 1) and also taking items as the random factor with the effects of word frequency as a between-items factor with priming and prime task modality as within-items factors (identified by the subscript 2).
The main effect of prime task modality was not significant, F,(l, 26) < 1, F 2 (l, 34) < 1. There was a marginally significant main effect of priming in the analysis by-participant and a significant effect by item, F,(l, 26) = 3.2, p < .08, F 2 (l, 34) = 8.70, p < .01, indicating that responses in the "primed" conditions (616 ms) were faster than in the "unprimed" conditions (636 ms). The interaction between prime task modality and priming was significant, F,(l, 26) = 6.00, p < .02, F 2 (l, 34) = 4.53, p < .05. The interaction between prime task modality and word frequency approached significance in the by-participants analysis and was significant in the by-items analysis, F,(l, 26) = 3.56, p = .07, F 2 (l, 34) = 4.17, p < .05. The interaction between priming and word frequency was not significant by participants but was significant by items, F,(l, 26) = 2.27, p = .14, F 2 (l, 34) = 5.25, p < .02. The three-way interaction among prime task modality, priming, and word frequency was not significant, F,(l, 26) < 1, F 2 (l, 34) < 1. Simple main effects were used to explore these interactions. The effect of priming for high-and low-frequency words was of particular interest. There was a significant effect of priming for low-frequency words after the visually presented prime task, F,(l, 26) = 8.30, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 20.47, p < .01. There was a significant effect of priming for high-frequency words after the visually presented prime task in the items analysis only, F,(l, 26) = 1.89, p = .18, F 2 (l, 34) = 3.93, p < .05. The effect of priming was not significant for auditory presented prime task for the high-or low-frequency words (all Fs < 1.7, allps > .19). This confirmed that neither the high-or low-frequency words produced cross-modality repetition priming. Parallel analyses were performed with ANOVA using the proportional scores. These produced an analogous pattern of results, supporting our interpretation of the data.
Discussion
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that low-frequency words would produce more cross-modal facilitation compared with highfrequency words. An advantage for low-frequency words was found for the visually presented prime task. However, no crossmodal facilitation occurred for high-or low-frequency words when presented as a familiarity decision task. Therefore, evidence of word frequency affecting cross-modal presentation was not found. It can, therefore, be concluded that word frequency was unlikely to be responsible for the cross-modal facilitation found in Experiment 1. Because a familiarity decision task was used in Experiment 2 and similar results to those obtained with a lexical decision task in Experiment 1 were obtained, differences in cross-modality priming as a result of task demands can be eliminated.
A further consideration is the conceptual specificity of names. A number of authors suggested that people's names occupy the subordinate level of a conceptual hierarchy, whereas object names occupy the base level of a hierarchy (e.g., Durso & O'Sullivan, 1983; Tranel et al., 1997) . The same argument may be posed for differences between landmark names and country names. In Experiment 3 we aimed to identify whether conceptual specificity could be responsible for the differences in cross-modal facilitation found in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3
We investigated names derived from a conceptual hierarchy. Previously, Durso and O'Sullivan (1983) suggested the characteristics of proper-name processing could be explained in terms of a general-specific hypothesis; proper names were conceptually specific compared with common names. Similar proposals have also emerged in the neuropsychological literature. Tranel et al. (1997) suggested that hierarchical differences may account for selective deficits and sparing of word categories in aphasic patients. To test whether these differences could account for differences in crossmodal facilitation found in Experiment 1, highly specific dog breed names were compared with a set of very general animal names using the cross-modal methodology. If a high degree of conceptual specificity is responsible for cross-modality priming, then significant cross-modal facilitation would be expected for the subordinate dog breed names but not for the general animal names.
Method
As in Experiment 2, within-modality and cross-modality priming were compared between participants and the effect of priming was a withinparticipant factor. There was an additional within-participants factor of name type (specific dog breeds, general animals). The numbers of critical stimuli remained as in Experiment 2, so that there were 18 critical items in each primed and unprimed set. Half of these items were dog breed names, and half were animal names (see Appendix C for a list of the critical stimuli). The number of filler and unfamiliar items were increased accordingly (half of the items represented general names and half represented specific names). In the prime phase there were 90 trials: 18 critical items to be primed plus 27 filler items and 45 unfamiliar items. In the test phase of the experiment there were also 90 trials: 36 critical items (18 primed items, 18 unprimed items), 9 filler items, and 45 unfamiliar items. Each phase of the experiment was preceded by 10 practice trials. Participants made a familiarity decision in both phases of the experiment. The procedure was the same as Experiments 1 and 2.
Participants. Twenty-eight participants (6 men and 22 women) took part in the experiment. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years (M = 31 years). Figure 4 illustrates the mean proportional facilitation for animal names and dog breed names after within-and cross-modality presentation. An analysis of the raw reaction time data was carried out with ANOVA by participants, taking prime task modality as a between-participants factor and name type and priming as withinparticipant factors (identified with the subscript 1; see Table 3 for data). An analysis by items was also performed, taking prime task modality and priming as within-items comparison and name type -0.05. Figure 4 . Mean proportional facilitation in reaction time to decision during test phase as a function of prime task modality and name specificity. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the effect of prime task modality. as a between-items factor (identified with the subscript 2). The main effect of prime task modality was significant, F x (l, 26) = 7.80, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 6.31, p < .01. Responses after the auditory prime task were slower (717 ms) than those after the visually presented prime task (598 ms). Once again, this effect can be attributed to practice. The main effect of priming was significant, F,(l, 26) = 13.95, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 20.48, p < .01. Responses in the "primed" condition were faster (633 ms) than those in the "unprimed" condition (682 ms). There was a main effect of name type, F,(l, 26) = 57.62, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 45.88, p < .01. It took longer to respond to the dog breed names (760 ms) than the general animal names (615 ms) at the base level of the hierarchy. The comparison pertinent to the experimental hypothesis concerns the interaction term. The interaction between prime task modality and priming was significant in the by-participants analysis, Fi(l, 26) = 7.01, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 2.86, p = .09. The interaction among prime task modality, name type, and priming was not significant, F,(l, 26) < 1, F 2 (l, 34) = 2.26, p = .14. Simple main effects were used to explore this interaction. The effect of priming was significant for both types of names after the visually presented prime task by participant, dog names: F^l, 26) = 18.6, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 10.87, p < .02; animal names: F,(l, 26) = 4.29, p < .04, F 2 (l, 34) < 1. The effect of priming after the auditory presented prime task was not significant (both FjS < 1, F 2 s < 1.5, all ps > .22). Parallel analysis were also carried out on the proportional scores, producing analogous findings, and supported this interpretation.
Results
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Discussion
The results clearly show that neither specific names of dog breeds or general names of animals produce cross-modal facilitation. The lack of priming cannot be attributed to a lack of power because the same stimuli produced significant facilitation when the prime phase and the test phase were presented within the same modality. The interpretation of Experiment 3 must be that differences in the cross-modal effects observed for the landmark and the country name stimuli cannot be attributed simply to differences in specificity at a conceptual level. This finding refutes Durso and O'Sullivan's (1983) claim that the characteristics of proper-name processing emerged as a function of their conceptual specificity. These data also confirm that common names do not produce facilitation after a cross-modality familiarity decision. This finding suggests that when the experimental task requires activation to pass from a lemma directly to the conceptual system, no crossmodal facilitation occurs in a familiarity decision task. Furthermore, the dog breed names must be of a lower frequency than the more general animal names. Therefore, these data confirm the findings of Experiment 2, providing further evidence that facilitation occurring in the cross-modal priming paradigm is unlikely to be influenced by an effect of word frequency.
Experiment 4
If there are indeed differences in the representation of different categories of proper noun, these differences should also be apparent in other paradigms. Valentine et al. (1998) provided evidence that producing someone's name in response to seeing their face facilitated a subsequent name familiarity decision to the same person's written name.
As a familiar face is encountered, the appropriate token recognition unit that codes for the visual image would become active. In turn, the corresponding token marker would become active and pass activation onto the appropriate lemma. After lemma selection, the phonology of the name would be retrieved and passed for articulation. A subsequent name familiarity decision task requires activation to pass between the lemma and the identity information represented at the token marker. Because both of these tasks require processing between the token marker and lemma, it is predicted that naming the face of a celebrity would produce an effect of repetition on a subsequent name familiarity decision to the same person's name.
Facilitation is not produced if the prime task involved a face familiarity decision rather than name production. A familiarity decision to a face does not require the lemma to become activated. Therefore, a face familiarity decision is not expected to prime a subsequent name familiarity decision. In this case the prime task only requires processing between the token recognition unit and the token marker, whereas the task during the test phase requires processing between the token marker and the lemma.
Similarly, if the test phase task required name production task rather than a name familiarity decision, the locus of priming would be placed at the lexeme. Consequently, a different set of predictions emerges when the test phase requires name production rather than the name familiarity decision task. Studies that are based on these predictions are reported elsewhere (Hollis & Valentine, in press ). Valentine et al. (1998) did not report any new evidence on facilitation from picture naming as a prime task for common nouns. Evidence reveals mixed findings regarding repetition after name production. Production of an everyday object name does not prime a subsequent lexical decision to the same item's name (e.g., Morton, 1979; Scarborough et al., 1979; Winnick & Daniel, 1970) . In contrast, name production has been found to benefit explicit recognition of the same item's name (e.g., Park et al., 1998) . In Experiment 4 we aimed to replicate the original findings of Valentine et al. (1998) using people's faces and names as stimuli. In addition, the study was extended to investigate the facilitation produced when other categories of proper names served as stimuli (pictures and names of famous people and landmarks, images of maps, and names of countries). The experiment also included pictures of objects and their names as stimuli. In line with the original hypothesis, it was predicted that a face-naming task would prime a subsequent name familiarity decision when people's names were used as stimuli. The facilitation occurs because both face naming and name familiarity decision to people's names are tasks that require processing between the token marker and the lemma. Thus, any facilitation produced after the name production prime task would be comparable to that observed when the same item was repeated for a name familiarity decision during the prime and test phase. In contrast, the face familiarity decision does not require processing between the token marker and the lemma; therefore, no priming is expected.
Object picture naming followed by lexical decision does not involve processing using a token marker. Although picture naming involves processing with the conceptual system, it operates by diffuse links, not a token marker. A lexical decision to a common name can be made on the basis of activation of the lemma alone and does not require access to the conceptual system. Therefore, no comparable facilitation was expected when an object-naming task was followed with a lexical-decision task to the same item's name.
Given the findings of Experiment 1, the processing characteristics of country names are uncertain. If the lack of cross-modality priming in Experiment 1 occurred as a result of differences in cognitive architecture, then it follows that analogous findings would be apparent in the name production experiments; the production of a country name would not prime a familiarity decision to a visually presented country name.
Method
Participants. A total of 240 people (54 men and 186 women) participated in the experiment. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 45 years (M = 21 years).
Stimuli/apparatus. Two sets of 9 critical items were formed for each noun category, as for Experiment 1 (see Appendix A). The pictorial stimuli were formed by selecting a black and white digitized image for each item. The image was 6 X 6-cm in the center of the visual display. An additional 41 images (for each noun category) were selected as familiar filler items for the picture-naming task. A further 25 unfamiliar images for the picture familiarity prime task were also found as stimuli in the picture familiarity decision task. For the category of people, images were simply faces of celebrities and unknown people. For the category of landmarks, images were of famous and unfamiliar buildings, monuments, and so on. Equal proportions of buildings, bridges, monuments, and natural landmarks were assigned to serve as critical, filler, and unfamiliar items. For the category of countries, a selection of blank map outlines were used as stimuli (names of cities, towns, and so on were removed). On each map, an arrow indicated which country was to be named. Maps were made "unfamiliar" for use in the picture familiarity decision by distorting coastline and positioning the arrow so that the countries in question were no longer recognizable. For the everyday object stimuli, series of line drawing were selected. The unfamiliar picture items were nonobjects, taken from a study by Kroll and Potter (1984) . For the test phase, a selection of filler and unfamiliar names was formed as in Experiment 1.
Design. The experiment had a mixed design with three factors: noun category (people, landmarks, countries, objects) and prime task (picture naming, picture familiarity decision, and name familiarity decision or lexical decision) were between-participants factors. Priming (primed vs. unprimed) was a within-participants factor.
For each noun category, there were two sets of nine critical items. One of these sets appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Re-sponses to these items formed the data for the primed items. The other set of nine critical items appeared only in the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the unprimed items. With the exception of the primed items, no other items were repeated between prime and test. The assignment of items to the primed and unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for each combination of prime phase task.
The experiment consisted of two phases: a prime phase and a test phase. For the prime phase, participants who received proper name stimuli performed a picture familiarity decision, a picture-naming task, or a name familiarity task. Participants who received the object names performed a picture familiarity decision, a picture naming task, or a lexical-decision task. The prime phase for the picture-naming conditions consisted of 50 images (9 primed critical items and 41 familiar filler items). The prime phase for the picture familiarity decision consisted of 9 images of the critical items (primed), 16 filler (familiar) items, and 25 unfamiliar items. The prime phase for the name familiarity and lexical decision consisted of the name of each item presented in uppercase 14-point Arial font in the center of the computer screen. In keeping with the other two prime tasks, the presentation consisted of 50 items: 9 critical items (primed), 16 filler familiar names, and 25 unfamiliar names.
The test phase was presented visually to all participants as a name familiarity decision for the proper name groups and as a lexical decision for the object name group. The test phase took the same format for all of the noun groups. The written names were presented in uppercase 14-point Arial font on a PC screen as in Experiment 1. The participants' responses were recorded using keypresses on the keyboard. The experiment was programmed using MEL2. Reaction times were recorded with millisecond accuracy.
Procedure. Participants were allocated to one of the noun categories and took part in a prime phase followed by a test phase. Each phase was preceded by 10 practice trials. During the prime phase, participants performed the picture-naming task, the picture familiarity task, or the name familiarity task (lexical decision in the case of the object stimuli). All stimuli were presented on the computer screen in a random order. In the picture-naming condition, participants were asked to articulate the name of the item as quickly as possible. If the participant was found to be in a "tip-of-the-tongue" state, the first phoneme was given as a prompt. Once the participant had given a vocal response, the experimenter recorded the accuracy of the response by keypress. For the picture familiarity decision, participants saw the series of stimuli and were asked to make a familiarity decision to each item by keypress as quickly as possible. In the name familiarity decision, participants were shown the selection of famous and unfamiliar names and asked to make a familiarity decision by keypress as quickly as possible. The group of participants who received the object stimuli were asked to make a lexical decision by keypress as quickly and accurately as possible.
The prime phase was followed by the test phase, which involved a name familiarity decision (or lexical decision) presented on computer. As in Experiment 1, participants were not informed of this additional task. Each of the experimental trials consisted of a 250-ms tone, followed after 500 ms by presentation of the stimulus. In each trial, a name was presented and participants were instructed to make a familiarity decision (or lexical decision) by pressing yes or no using the keys provided. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. The participants' response terminated the display of the stimulus.
Results
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test phase were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was included in the analyses only if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test phase. The minimum number of critical primed items contributing to each cell of the analysis was 5. The mean reaction time and accuracy of responses to the target items are given in Table 4 . A proportional facilitation score was calculated for each data point (unprimed response timeprimed response time / unprimed response time). The proportional facilitation scores are plotted as a function of noun type and prime task modality in Figure 5 .
An analysis of the raw reaction times was also performed on the data from each noun group separately, taking participants as the random factor with noun category as a between-participants comparison and the effect of priming as a within-participants factor (identified by the subscript 1). An analysis was also performed with items as the random factor and noun category as a betweenitems comparison and the effect of priming as a within-items factor (identified by the subscript 2).
For the category of people's names, the main effect of prime task was significant only in the by-items analysis, F,(2, 57) = 1.06,p = .35, F 2 (2, 34) = 17.59,p < .01. Responses in the name familiarity decision were faster (654 ms) than those in the other conditions (714 ms, 711 ms). This effect could be attributed to practice. There was a significant main effect of priming, Fj(l, 57) = 14.98,p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 17.20, p < .01, confirming that response times to the primed items were faster (670 ms) than those to the unprimed items (717 ms). The Priming X Prime Task interaction was significant, F,(2, 57) = 3.66, p < .05, F 2 (2, 34) = 4.11, p < .05. Simple main effects indicated that significant priming occurred after the name familiarity decision prime task, F,(l, 57) = 12.85, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 32.54,p < .01, and after the face naming prime task, F,(l, 57) = 9.47, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 9.17, p < .01. No comparable priming occurred after the face familiarity decision prime task, F,(l, 57) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) < 1.
For the category of landmark names, the main effect of prime task was significant, F t (2, 57) = 4.09, p < .05, F 2 (2, 34) = 18.08, p < .01. There was a significant main effect of priming, F,(l, 57) = 20.76, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 21.15,p < .01, confirming that response times to the primed items (742 ms) were faster than those Note. Reaction time is measured in milliseconds. Response accuracy is based on a total of 9. to the unprimed items (818 ms). The Priming X Prime Task interaction was significant in the by-participant analysis, F^, 57) = 4.06, p < .05, F 2 (2, 34) = 1.78, p = .18. Simple main effects indicated that significant priming occurred after the name familiarity decision prime task, Fj(l, 57) = 14.19, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 4.92, p < .05, and after the landmark naming prime task, F,(l, 57) = 15.60, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 4.19, p < .05. No comparable priming occurred after the landmark familiarity decision prime task, F,(l, 57) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) < 1. For the category of country names, the main effect of prime task was not significant, Fj(2, 57) < 1, F 2 (2, 34) = 2.46, p = .10. There was a marginally significant main effect of priming, F,(l, 57) = 3.47, p = .06, F 2 (l, 34) = 4.20, p < .05. The Priming X Prime Task interaction was significant only in the by-participant analysis, F^l, 57) = 3.14, p < .05, F 2 (2, 34) = 1.68, p = .19. Simple main effects indicated that significant priming occurred in the by-participants analysis, and a marginally significant effect of priming was found in the by-items analysis after the name familiarity decision prime task, F^l, 57) = 9.10, p < .01, F 2 (l, 17) = 3.34, p = .08. No significant priming was found after the country-naming prime task, F,(l, 57) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) = 1.83, p = .19. No priming occurred after the country familiarity decision prime task, F,(l, 57) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) < 1.
For the category of object names, the main effect of prime task was significant only in the by-items analysis, F,(2, 57) = 1.26, p = .28, F 2 (2, 34) = 14.20, p < .01. Responses after the lexicaldecision prime task were faster (546 ms) than those after the other types of prime task (577 ms, 608 ms). Once again, this could be explained as a practice effect. There was a significant main effect of priming in the by-participant analysis only, F^l, 57) = 6.59, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 1.20, p = .28. The Priming X Prime Task interaction was not significant, F t (2, 57) = 2.80, p = .06, F 2 (2, 34) = 2.13, p = A3. Simple main effects indicated that significant priming occurred after the name familiarity decision prime task in the by-participant analysis, F,(l, 57) = 10.59, p < .05, F 2 (l, 17) = 2.26, p = .15. No priming occurred after the object-naming prime task, F,(l, 57) = 1.60, p = .21, F 2 (l, 17) < 1. No priming occurred after the object familiarity decision prime task, F t (l, 57) < 1, F 2 (l, 17) < 1.
Data from the name production prime task alone were analyzed with participants as the random factor with noun category as a between-participants comparison and the effect of priming as a within-participants factor (identified by the subscript 1). An analysis was also performed with items as the random factor with noun category as a between-items comparison and the effect of priming as a within-items factor (identified by the subscript 2). The interaction between noun category and priming was significant, Fj(3, 76) = 4.65, p < .01, F 2 (3, 68) = 4.80, p < .01. Simple main effects were used to explore the interaction. There was a significant effect of priming for people's names, F,(l, 76) = 6.72, p < .01, F 2 (l, 68) = 9.73, p < .01, and landmark names, F/l, 76) = 21.33, p < .01, F 2 (l, 68) = 22.47,/? < .01. However, the effect of priming was not significant for country names or object names (all Fs < 1).
It can be concluded that facilitation produced after face-naming prime task and the landmark-naming prime task were similar. When country name stimuli were produced, no priming occurred, and processing was similar to that observed when the naming of object pictures was followed by a lexical decision. Parallel analyses with the proportional scores were also performed and produced analogous findings, supporting our interpretation of the data.
Discussion
Experiment 4 has shown that naming a famous face or landmark facilitates a subsequent familiarity decision to that same item's name. In contrast, producing a country name did not provide similar facilitation. Furthermore, naming a picture of an everyday object did not facilitate a lexical decision to the same item's name.
These findings are consistent with those found with the crossmodality presentation of Experiment 1. Once again, there were differences in the unprimed baseline for the different categories of noun. As discussed previously, these differences can be derived from the model but may also be attributable to differences in word length across the various noun categories. In view of the results of Experiments 2 and 3, it unlikely that the pattern of facilitation observed could be accounted for by word frequency when there are changes in the presentation domain between prime and test.
Although research has produced evidence to suggest that facilitation can cross-domain between words and pictures for common names, support for this has not been found in the present data. Park et al. (1998) used a recognition task ("Have you seen this item previously?" yes/no) after a naming task and a word stem completion task. In contrast, the experiments reported here used a name familiarity decision ("Is this a name of a familiar item?" yes/no). The recognition task requires explicit recall, whereas the name familiarity decision is a test of implicit memory. Our data support the view based on earlier research that naming a picture of a common object does not facilitate subsequent recognition (lexical decision) of the same item's name (e.g., Morton, 1979; Scarborough et al., 1979; Winnick & Daniel, 1970) .
In both Experiments 1 and 4, country names show processing characteristics that are more akin to common names than with the other proper name stimuli that have been used. This finding can be explained by the model proposed by Valentine et al. (1996) if it is assumed that country names have a diffuse connectivity between the lemma and the conceptual system. If this is the case, the lemma rather than the token marker is the node that first allows access to the conceptual system. Therefore, under the processing assumptions made, a familiarity decision to a country name can be based on the activity of its lemma. Consequently, no priming after name production is found for country name stimuli presented in a name familiarity decision task, because there are no processing pathways in common to the prime and test task.
It might be argued that the images of maps and landmarks were not as memorable as the landmark pictures in terms of visual familiarity or complexity. These facets of the visual image may have made the landmark stimuli prone to an episodic influence compared with the country name stimuli (although note that the images were not presented during the test task). To determine whether such a factor could account for the differences in the processing of landmark and country names, an additional experiment was performed. Experiment 5 required participants to produce landmark or country names from the same pictorial stimulus. If differences in facilitation from production of the landmark and country names were still apparent, these data would provide further support for the idea that processing of names of landmarks and countries does indeed differ in their underlying cognitive architecture.
Experiment 5
The aim of Experiment 5 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 4 for country names and landmark names. The experimental design was adapted so that the participants produced either a country name or a landmark name to the same picture. This would identify whether the differences between the images used in Experiment 4 were responsible for the pattern of facilitation observed for country and landmark names. The requirement for participants to be able to produce both types of response reduced the number of suitable items that were available. Therefore, an intervening task was performed between the prime phase and the test phase in an attempt to reduce the possibility of episodic mediation of any facilitation attributable to repetition. In light of the results of Experiment 4, it was predicted that a landmarknaming task would prime a subsequent name familiarity decision when landmark names were used as stimuli. The facilitation would occur, because both the landmark-naming and name familiarity decision tasks require processing using the token marker-lemma link. In contrast, familiarity decision to a country is now assumed only to require processing as far as the lemma. Therefore, no comparable facilitation was expected after the production of country names. Differences in facilitation for the landmark and country names would provide further support for the idea that the processing of landmark and country names differs in the underlying cognitive architecture.
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight participants were tested. Data from four participants were discarded, because these participants were unable to name items during the prime task. Data from 24 (5 men and 19 women) people contributed to the analysis. The age of these participants ranged from 19 to 48 years (M = 32 years).
Stimuli. Two sets of nine critical items were formed by selecting a black and white digitized image of a famous landmark from different countries around the world (e.g. Eiffel Tower, France; Buckingham Palace, England; Statue of Liberty, United States; see Appendix D). Each item was selected from a different country so that no two stimuli (critical or filler item) depicted places from the same country. In addition to the critical items, six images of the same dimensions were selected as familiar filler items for naming. The dimensions of the images were the same as those used in Experiment 4.
Fifty unfamiliar images were chosen for the intervening task. Half of these images depicted natural landscapes (such as mountains, forests, and seascapes), and the other half depicted man-made structures (statues, buildings, and bridges). The unfamiliar pictures were not identifiable and could not be attributed to any particular country. A further 10 picture items were used for practice.
For the test phase, a selection of country and landmark names was formed as in Experiment 1. One set of stimuli consisted of landmark names. A separate set of country names was also compiled. Each set was composed of 18 stimuli that formed the two sets of critical items, together with 7 filler familiar items not presented in any other part of the experiment. Twenty-five unfamiliar items were formed as described in Experiment 1. A further 10 names were used for practice.
Design. The experiment had a mixed design with two factors: Prime task (landmark naming, country naming) was a between-participants factor. The effect of priming (primed, unprimed) was a within-participants factor.
For each prime task, there were two sets of nine critical items. One of these sets appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the primed items. The other set of nine critical items appeared only in the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the unprimed items. With the exception of the primed items, no other items were repeated between prime and test. The assignment of items to the primed and unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for each naming task.
The experiment consisted of three phases: a prime phase, an intervening task, and a test phase. For the prime phase, participants received either the landmark-naming task or the country-naming task. In each case the prime phase consisted of a total of 15 images (9 primed critical items and 6 famous filler items).
After the naming trials, all participants received the series of unfamiliar items and were asked to perform a man-made/natural decision by keypress as quickly as possible. The test phase was presented visually to all participants as a name familiarity decision task. Participants who produced landmark names during the prime phase received landmark names during the test phase. Similarly, participants who produced country names during the prime phase received country names during the test phase. The written names were presented in uppercase 14-point Arial font on the PC screen. The participants' responses were recorded using keypresses on the keyboard. The experiment was programmed using MEL2. Reaction times were recorded with millisecond accuracy.
Procedure. Participants were allocated to either the landmark name or the country name group and took part in a prime phase followed by the intervening task and the test phase. In the landmark-naming condition, participants were asked to articulate the specific name of the landmark as quickly as possible. If the participant was found to be in a tip-of-the-tongue state, the first phoneme was given as a prompt. Once the participant had given a vocal response, the experimenter recorded the accuracy of the response by keypress. The country-naming condition was conducted in the same way; however, participants were asked to produce the name of the country where the landmark could be found.
The prime phase was followed by the intervening task. All participants received the series of unfamiliar items and were asked to perform a man-made/natural decision by keypress as quickly as possible. The 50 items appeared in different random order for each participant.
Finally, the test phase was presented, which involved a name familiarity decision. The timing and procedure were the same as in Experiments 1 and 4, except that participants who produced landmark names performed the familiarity decision with familiar and unfamiliar landmark and, conversely, participants who had produced country names performed the familiarity decision with familiar and unfamiliar country name stimuli. Once again, participants were not given prior warning of this additional task. The test phase was preceded by 10 practice trials. All stimuli were presented on the computer screen in a different random order for each participant.
Results
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test phase were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was included in the analyses only if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test phases. The mean timing and accuracy of responses to the target items are given in Table 5 .
As before, a proportional facilitation score was calculated for each data point (unprimed response time -primed response time/unprimed response time). The mean proportional facilitation is plotted as a function of noun category in Figure 6 . An analysis of the raw reaction times was also performed with participants as the random factor, noun category as a betweenparticipants comparison, the effect of priming as a withinparticipants factor (identified by the subscript 1), and items as the random factor (identified by the subscript 2). There was a main effect of noun category, F,(l, 22) = 18.39, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 55.30, p < .01. Responses to the landmark names were slower (766 ms) than those to the country names (560 ms). This can be attributed to word length. There was a significant main effect of priming, F,(l, 22) = 15.35, p < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 5.37, p < .02. Responses in the primed condition were faster (641 ms) than those in the unprimed condition (685 ms). The interaction between noun category and priming was significant, F,(l, 22) = 9.77, p < .01; F 2 (l, 34) = 5.50, p < .02. Simple main effects were used to explore the interaction. There was a significant effect of priming for landmark names, F,(l, 22) = 24.79,/? < .01, F 2 (l, 34) = 10.90, p < .01. However, the effect of priming was not significant for country names (both Fs < 1). This showed that significant priming occurred for the landmark names but not for the country names. Parallel analyses were performed with the proportional scores, which produced analogous findings.
Discussion
The results clearly indicate that producing the name of a landmark facilitates the subsequent familiarity decision to the same item's name. This finding contrasts with producing country names, in which no comparable facilitation was found. In this experiment, the verbal responses made during the prime phase were produced in response to seeing the same picture. Thus, it is unlikely that differences in the quality of the pictorial images (for the landmark and country stimuli) that were used in Experiment 4 were respon-sible for the lack of facilitation observed for country names in that experiment. Similarly, the findings of the current experiment cannot be attributed to one class of image being more memorable than the other. The vocal responses were made to the same stimuli with noun category manipulated as a within-participant factor. Therefore, differences in performance between groups of participants cannot account for the differences in priming observed. The intervening task was used to minimize the influence of episodic retrieval, making episodic explanations untenable. The results of this experiment, therefore, support the interpretation of Experiments 1 and 4.
General Discussion
The experiments indicate that people's names and landmark names have similar processing characteristics. Experiment 1 indicated that people's names and landmark names produce crossmodality repetition priming, whereas no cross-modal facilitation was found for when country names were presented for familiarity decision. Similarly, no cross-modal facilitation was found when common names (object names) were presented for lexical decision. Experiment 2 confirmed that common names do not produce cross-modal facilitation when presented in a familiarity decision task. The manipulation of frequency also identified that the crossmodal priming found with the people's names and landmark names could not be easily accounted for by an effect of word frequency. Experiment 3 excluded specificity of a name as an explanation for differences found in the cross-modality facilitation for landmark names and country names. Neither base level nor subordinate classes of names produced cross-modality facilitation when presented for name familiarity decision.
Experiment 4 found that producing the name of a person or a landmark facilitated a subsequent name familiarity decision to the same item's name. These findings contrasted with those found with the same tasks that involved country name stimuli. Country names did not produce priming of a name familiarity decision task after name production. Similarly, common names (object names) did not produce priming of a lexical-decision task after name production.
Experiment 5 confirmed that producing the name of a landmark facilitated a subsequent name familiarity decision to the same item's name. Once again, country names did not produce priming of a name familiarity decision task after name production. Experiment 5 required that both the landmark names and the country names were produced in response to seeing the same pictures. Therefore, the priming found in Experiment 4 could not be attributed to differences in the images presented in the prime phase of the experiment. Furthermore, Experiment 5 manipulated noun category as a within-participant factor. Therefore, differences between groups of participants cannot account for the differences in priming observed.
Previous research suggested that uniqueness, meaninglessness, or conceptual specificity can account for the characteristics of proper-name processing. The current series of experiments are difficult to reconcile with an explanation in terms of uniqueness, because people's names, landmark names, and country names are all unique. For example, there is only one Bill Clinton, one Statue of Liberty and one United States of America. In spite of their uniqueness, these stimuli produce different cognitive phenomena.
Landmark names often contain a greater degree of meaning compared with people's names and country names that can be considered arbitrary. For example, the Eiffel Tower is a tower and Tower Bridge is a bridge, next to the Tower of London. However, although people's names and landmark names differ in their degree of meaning, they produce the same cognitive phenomena. Experiment 3 provided no evidence that conceptual specificity was responsible for cross-domain and cross-modal facilitation that has been found for people's names and names of landmarks. Therefore, none of these simple explanations in terms of uniqueness and meaninglessness or conceptual specificity alone are sufficient to capture the true nature of proper-name processing.
If the key to the characteristics of proper-name processing is the fact that proper names are pure referencing expressions, one would expect that only subcategories of proper name that have pure reference would produce cross-modal and cross-domain priming phenomena. Both landmark names and people's names can be deemed to be pure referencing expressions. It should be noted that people's names and landmark names do not normally take a adjectival form. In contrast, country names can act as adjectives. Therefore, country names have sense and so are not pure referencing expressions. This attribute indicates that connectivity between the lemma and the conceptual system for a country name is likely to require diffuse multiple connections. This connectivity is likely to resemble that of common name representations rather than the single connection between the lemma and the token marker that we postulate exists for people's names and landmark names. The data indicate that it is pure reference that is captured in a model such as that proposed by Valentine et al. (1996) in terms of the token marker-lemma linkage. The observed cognitive phenomena of cross-modal and cross-domain priming appear to reflect the processing of purely referring expressions.
One area of interest is the organization of lemmas involved in lexical access. This is an area that is receiving great research interest (e.g., Damian & Martin, 1999; Kempen & Huijbers, 1983; Cutting & Ferreira, 1999; Miozzo & Caramazza, 1999) . Valentine et al. (1996) described the internal structure of the lexicon, in which a lemma exists for each lexical entry, including lexical compounds. Although a large volume of work exists regarding semantic and phonological processes involved in speech production, less emphasis has been placed on words from different subcategories and classes. Proper names such as people's names and names of landmarks are interesting because they are lexical compounds. Further research using lexical compounds would help to specify the organization of the lemma, and a comparison of different nouns may also help to enhance our general understanding of lexicalization.
In summary, the data reported in these experiments support the model proposed by Valentine et al. (1996) , being extended to some classes of proper name other than people's names (i.e., landmarks). The data also demonstrate that the role of a token marker is not universal for all categories of proper name (i.e., not country names). 
